RAND 2003 تقرير راند

بسم الله 
من رسالة على اليوتوب
==================================
السلام عليكم ورحمه الله وبركاته
إخواني هذا تقرير مؤسسه راند الأمريكيه المشهور والذي صدر عام 2003 وفيه دراسه وافيه مستفيضه عن كيفيه تهجيننا كأفراد ومجموعات لما فيه مصلحه الإستعمار الحديث.
وأهم شيء فيه هو محاربته للعقيده الصحيحه وأهلها والتقليل من شأنهم وتشجيعه للعقائد الباطله وأهلها ومؤآزرتهم في نشر أباطيلهم
وهذا كله مشاهد اليوم ويتم تطبيقه بالحرف الواحد في جميع وسائل الإعلام وفي الحياه الواقعيه حيث أن كل القرارات الجديده تصب في مصلحه التغيير والتجديد والمراجعات لمشائخ السنه حيث لسان حالهم يقول أنا آسف لقد كنت على عقيده خاطئه واليوم تراجعت عنها وهذا موجود في الصحف وغيرها ,وكذلك لاتجد في العالم كله سجناء من العلماء إلآ علماء أهل السنه حتى لا يبقى طليقآ إلآمن أذعن وسمع وأطاع:
http://www.harfnews.org/news.php?action=show&id=963

***************************************
وهناك ملاحظه مهمه وهو ان هناك تقرير آخر صدر بعد هذا حاولوا فيه تشتيت الأذهان عن هذا التقرير وقد تلقفت كثير من وسائل الإعلام ذلك التقرير وتركت هذا وكذلك الترجمه وجدت للجديد ترجمه ولم أجد لهذا وربما يكون ذلك عن قصد :والفرق بينهما هو أن هذا يقول يجب محاربه السلفيه وتشجيع غيرهم ودعمهم
والثاني يقول يجب محاربه كل المسلمين وهذا فيه تضليل لأن الأول فضحهم والثاني محاوله تضليل لا أكثر والدليل هو أن الذي يُطبق في الواقع هو التقرير الأول
التقرير طويل وقد وضعت الخلاصه في المقدمه لتسهيل فهم القصد من التقرير.. :
Rand R. P.1
WAR ON ISLAM

Report rand 2003
Assalam alikomwarahmatoALLAH
this is the last part of RAND's recommendations for the west for how to attack ISLAM
plz be aware of this ,It is very important study and talks about every single detail about muslims..and how to adopte them by western way..!!!

****************
[THE END OF THE REPORT IS FIRST]:

61
Appendix C
STRATEGY IN DEPTH
The following describes, in somewhat more detail, how the recommendations
in Chapter Three could be implemented.
BASIC POINTS OF THE STRATEGY
Build Up a Modernist Leadership
Create role models and leaders. Modernists who risk persecution should be
built up as courageous civil rights leaders, which indeed they are. There are
precedents showing that this can work. Nawal Al-Sadaawi achieved international
renown for enduring persecution, harassment, and attempts to prosecute
her in court on account of her principled modernist stand on issues related to
freedom of speech, public health, and the status of women in Egypt. Afghan
interim minister of womens affairs Sima Samar inspired many with her outspoken
stance on human rights, womens rights, civil law, and democracy, for
which she faced death threats by fundamentalists. There are many others
throughout the Islamic world whose leadership can similarly be featured.
Include modern, mainstream Muslims in political outreach events, to reflect
demographic reality. Avoid artificially over-Islamizing the Muslims; instead,
accustom them to the idea that Islam can be just one part of their identity.1
Support civil society in the Islamic world. This is particularly important in situations
of crisis, refugee situations, and postconflict situations, in which a democratic
leadership can emerge and gain practical experience through local NGOs
and other civic associations. On the rural and neighborhood levels, as well, civic
associations are an infrastructure that can lead to political education and a
moderate, modernist leadership.
______________
1This idea is more extensively developed in Al-Azmah (1993). Al-Azmah is himself a Euro-Muslim.
62 Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies
Develop Western Islam: German Islam, U.S. Islam, etc. This requires gaining a
better understanding of the composition, as well as the evolving practice and
thought, in these communities. Assist in eliciting, expressing, and codifying
their views.
Go on the Offensive Against Fundamentalists
Delegitimize individuals and positions associated with extremist Islam. Make
public the immoral and hypocritical deeds and statements of self-styled fundamentalist
authorities. Allegations of Western immorality and shallowness are
a cherished part of the fundamentalist arsenal, but they are themselves highly
vulnerable on these fronts.
Encourage Arab journalists in popular media to do investigative reporting on
the lives and personal habits and corruption of fundamentalist leaders. Publicize
incidents that highlight their brutality—such as the recent deaths of Saudi
schoolgirls in a fire when religious police physically prevented Saudi firefighters
from evacuating the girls from their burning school building because they were
not veiled—and their hypocrisy, illustrated by the Saudi religious establishment,
which forbids migrant workers from receiving photographs of their newborn
children on the grounds that Islam forbids human images, while their own
offices are decorated by huge portraits of King Faisal, etc. The role of charitable
organizations in financing terror and extremism has begun to be more clearly
understood since September 11 but also deserves ongoing and public investigation.
Assertively Promote the Values of Western Democratic Modernity
Create and propagate a model for prosperous, moderate Islam by identifying
and actively aiding countries or regions or groups with the appropriate views.
Publicize their successes. For example, the 1999 Beirut Declaration for Justice
and the National Action Charter of Bahrain broke new ground in the application
of Islamic law and should be made more widely known.
Criticize the flaws of traditionalism. Show the causal relationship between
traditionalism and underdevelopment, as well as the causal relationship
between modernity, democracy, progress, and prosperity. Do fundamentalism
and traditionalism offer Islamic society a healthy, prosperous future? Are they
successfully meeting the challenges of the day? Do they compare well with
other social orders? The UNDP social development report (UNDP, 2002) points
clearly to the linkage between a stagnant social order, oppression of women,
poor educational quality, and backwardness. This message should be energetically
taken to Muslim populations.
Strategy in Depth 63
Build up the stature of Sufism. Encourage countries with strong Sufi traditions
to focus on that part of their history and to include it in their school curricula.
Pay more attention to Sufi Islam.
Focus on Education and Youth
Committed adult adherents of radical Islamic movements are unlikely to be
easily influenced into changing their views. The next generation, however, can
conceivably be influenced if the message of democratic Islam can be inserted
into school curricula and public media in the pertinent countries. Radical fundamentalists
have established massive efforts to gain influence over education
and are unlikely to give up established footholds without a struggle. An equally
energetic effort will be required to wrest this terrain from them.
SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES TO SUPPORT THE STRATEGY
Thus, to accomplish the overall strategy, it will be necessary to
• Support the modernists and mainstream secularists first, by
— publishing and distribute their works
— encouraging them to write for mass audiences and youth
— introducing their views into the curriculum of Islamic education
— giving them a public platform
— making their opinions and judgments on fundamental questions of
religious interpretation available to a mass audience, in competition
with those of the fundamentalists and traditionalists, who already have
Web sites, publishing houses, schools, institutes, and many other vehicles
for disseminating their views
— positioning modernism as a counterculture option for disaffected
Islamic youth
— facilitating and encouraging awareness of pre- and non-Islamic history
and culture, in the media and in the curricula of relevant countries
— encouraging and supporting secular civic and cultural institutions and
programs.
• Support the traditionalists against the fundamentalists, by
— publicizing traditionalist criticism of fundamentalist violence and
extremism and encouraging disagreements between traditionalists and
fundamentalists
— preventing alliances between traditionalists and fundamentalists
64 Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies
— encouraging cooperation between modernists and traditionalists who
are closer to that end of the spectrum, increase the presence and profile
of modernists in traditionalist institutions
— discriminating between different sectors of traditionalism
— encouraging those with a greater affinity to modernism—such as the
Hanafi law school as opposed to others to issue religious opinions that,
by becoming popularized, can weaken the authority of backward
Wahhabi religious rulings
— encouraging the popularity and acceptance of Sufism.
• Confront and oppose the fundamentalists, by
— challenging and exposing the inaccuracies in their views on questions
of Islamic interpretation
— exposing their relationships with illegal groups and activities
— publicizing the consequences of their violent acts
— demonstrating their inability to rule to the benefit and positive development
of their communities
— targeting these messages especially to young people, to pious traditionalist
populations, to Muslim minorities in the West, and to women
— avoiding showing respect or admiration for the violent feats of fundamentalist
extremists and terrorists, instead casting them as disturbed
and cowardly rather than evil heroes
— encouraging journalists to investigate issues of corruption, hypocrisy,
and immorality in fundamentalist and terrorist circles.
• Selectively support secularists, by
— encouraging recognition of fundamentalism as a shared enemy, discouraging
secularist alliances with anti-U.S. forces on such grounds as
nationalism and leftist ideology
— supporting the idea that religion and the state can be separate in Islam,
too, and that this does not endanger the faith
THE END
**********************************

Cheryl Benard

Supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation

R

National Security Research Division

Partners, Resources,

and Strategies

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing

objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing

the public and private sectors around the world. RANDs publications do

not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.

R® is a registered trademark.

© Copyright 2003 RAND Corporation

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form

by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying,

recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in

writing from RAND.

Published 2003 by the RAND Corporation

1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138

1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050

201 North Craig Street, Suite 202, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-1516

RAND URL: http://www.rand.org/

To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact

Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002;

Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: order@rand.org

Cover design by Eileen Delson La Russo

The research described in this report was sponsored by the Smith

Richardson Foundation.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Benard, Cheryl, 1953-

Civil democratic Islam, partners, resources, and strategies / Cheryl Benard.

p. cm.

MR-1716.

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 0-8330-3438-3 (pbk.)

1. Islam and civil society. 2. Islamic modernism. 3. Democracy—Religious

aspects—Islam. 4. Islam—University. 5. Islam—21st century. I.Title.

BP173.63 .B46 2003

320.5'5'0917671—dc21

2003012442

iii

PREFACE

The Islamic world is involved in a struggle to determine its own nature and values,

with serious implications for the future. What role can the rest of the world,

threatened and affected as it is by this struggle, play in bringing about a more

peaceful and positive outcome?

Devising a judicious approach requires a finely grained understanding of the

ongoing ideological struggle within Islam, to identify appropriate partners and

set realistic goals and means to encourage its evolution in a positive way.

The United States has three goals in regard to politicized Islam. First, it wants to

prevent the spread of extremism and violence. Second, in doing so, it needs to

avoid the impression that the United States is opposed to Islam. And third, in

the longer run, it must find ways to help address the deeper economic, social,

and political causes feeding Islamic radicalism and to encourage a move toward

development and democratization.

The debates and conflicts that mark the current Islamic world can make the

picture seem confusing. It becomes easier to sort the actors if one thinks of

them not as belonging to distinct categories but as falling along a spectrum.

Their views on certain critical marker issues help to locate them correctly on

this spectrum.

It is then possible to see which part of the spectrum is generally compatible

with our values, and which is fundamentally inimical. On this basis, this report

identifies components of a specific strategy.

This report should be of interest to scholars, policymakers, students, and all

others interested in the Middle East, Islam, and political Islam.


v

CONTENTS

Preface .................................................. iii

Tables ................................................... vii

Summary ................................................ ix

Acknowledgments .......................................... xiii

Glossary ................................................. xv

Chapter One

MAPPING THE ISSUES: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE RANGE

OF THOUGHT IN CONTEMPORARY ISLAM ................... 1

The Setting: Shared Problems, Different Answers ................ 3

Positions on Key Issues ................................... 14

Democracy and Human Rights ............................ 14

Polygamy ............................................ 15

Criminal Punishments, Islamic Justice ...................... 17

Minorities ........................................... 20

Womens Dress ....................................... 21

Husbands Allowed to Beat Wives .......................... 22

Chapter Two

FINDING PARTNERS FOR THE PROMOTION OF

DEMOCRATIC ISLAM: OPTIONS ............................ 25

The Secularists ......................................... 25

The Fundamentalists ..................................... 27

The Traditionalists ...................................... 29

Distinguishing Between Traditionalists and Fundamentalists ..... 30

Potentially Useful Democratic Elements ..................... 33

The Danger of Domestic Backlash ......................... 34

The Potential for Weakening Credibility and Moral

Persuasiveness ...................................... 36

The Possibility of Undermining Reforms .................... 37

vi Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies

The Modernists ......................................... 37

Modernism Has Respected Intellectuals and Leaders ........... 38

Weaknesses of the Modernists ............................ 39

Two Special Cases of Modernism .......................... 40

Sufis ............................................... 46

Chapter Three

A PROPOSED STRATEGY ................................. 47

Appendix A

THE HADITH WARS ..................................... 49

Appendix B

HIJAB AS A CASE STUDY .................................. 57

Appendix C

STRATEGY IN DEPTH .................................... 61

Appendix D

CORRESPONDENCE ABOUT THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

STATES PORTRAYAL OF ISLAM ............................ 65

Bibliography .............................................. 67

vii

TABLE

1. Marker Issues and the Major Ideological Positions in

Islam ............................................. 8


ix

SUMMARY

There is no question that contemporary Islam is in a volatile state, engaged in

an internal and external struggle over its values, its identity, and its place in the

world. Rival versions are contending for spiritual and political dominance. This

conflict has serious costs and economic, social, political, and security implications

for the rest of the world. Consequently, the West is making an increased

effort to come to terms with, to understand, and to influence the outcome of

this struggle.

Clearly, the United States, the modern industrialized world, and indeed the

international community as a whole would prefer an Islamic world that is compatible

with the rest of the system: democratic, economically viable, politically

stable, socially progressive, and follows the rules and norms of international

conduct. They also want to prevent a clash of civilizations in all of its possible

variants—from increased domestic unrest caused by conflicts between Muslim

minorities and native populations in the West to increased militancy across

the Muslim world and its consequences, instability and terrorism.

It therefore seems judicious to encourage the elements within the Islamic mix

that are most compatible with global peace and the international community

and that are friendly to democracy and modernity. However, correctly identifying

these elements and finding the most suitable way to cooperate with them is

not always easy.

Islams current crisis has two main components: a failure to thrive and a loss of

connection to the global mainstream. The Islamic world has been marked by a

long period of backwardness and comparative powerlessness; many different

solutions, such as nationalism, pan-Arabism, Arab socialism, and Islamic revolution,

have been attempted without success, and this has led to frustration and

anger. At the same time, the Islamic world has fallen out of step with contemporary

global culture, an uncomfortable situation for both sides.

Muslims disagree on what to do about this, and they disagree on what their

society ultimately should look like. We can distinguish four essential positions:

x Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies

• Fundamentalists reject democratic values and contemporary Western culture.

They want an authoritarian, puritanical state that will implement their

extreme view of Islamic law and morality. They are willing to use innovation

and modern technology to achieve that goal.

• Traditionalists want a conservative society. They are suspicious of

modernity, innovation, and change.

• Modernists want the Islamic world to become part of global modernity.

They want to modernize and reform Islam to bring it into line with the age.

• Secularists want the Islamic world to accept a division of church and state

in the manner of Western industrial democracies, with religion relegated to

the private sphere.

These groups hold distinctly different positions on essential issues that have

become contentious in the Islamic world today, including political and individual

freedom, education, the status of women, criminal justice, the legitimacy of

reform and change, and attitudes toward the West.

The fundamentalists are hostile to the West and to the United States in particular

and are intent, to varying degrees, on damaging and destroying democratic

modernity. Supporting them is not an option, except for transitory tactical

considerations. The traditionalists generally hold more moderate views, but

there are significant differences between different groups of traditionalists.

Some are close to the fundamentalists. None wholeheartedly embraces modern

democracy and the culture and values of modernity and, at best, can only make

an uneasy peace with them.

The modernists and secularists are closest to the West in terms of values and

policies. However, they are generally in a weaker position than the other

groups, lacking powerful backing, financial resources, an effective infrastructure,

and a public platform. The secularists, besides sometimes being unacceptable

as allies on the basis of their broader ideological affiliation, also have

trouble addressing the traditional sector of an Islamic audience.

Traditional orthodox Islam contains democratic elements that can be used to

counter the repressive, authoritarian Islam of the fundamentalists, but it is not

suited to be the primary vehicle of democratic Islam. That role falls to the

Islamic modernists, whose effectiveness, however, has been limited by a number

of constraints, which this report will explore.

To encourage positive change in the Islamic world toward greater democracy,

modernity, and compatibility with the contemporary international world order,

the United States and the West need to consider very carefully which elements,

trends, and forces within Islam they intend to strengthen; what the goals and

Summary xi

values of their various potential allies and protégés really are; and what the

broader consequences of advancing their respective agendas are likely to be. A

mixed approach composed of the following elements is likely to be the most

effective:

• Support the modernists first:

— Publish and distribute their works at subsidized cost.

— Encourage them to write for mass audiences and for youth.

— Introduce their views into the curriculum of Islamic education.

— Give them a public platform.

— Make their opinions and judgments on fundamental questions of religious

interpretation available to a mass audience in competition with

those of the fundamentalists and traditionalists, who have Web sites,

publishing houses, schools, institutes, and many other vehicles for disseminating

their views.

— Position secularism and modernism as a counterculture option for

disaffected Islamic youth.

— Facilitate and encourage an awareness of their pre- and non-Islamic

history and culture, in the media and the curricula of relevant countries.

— Assist in the development of independent civic organizations, to promote

civic culture and provide a space for ordinary citizens to educate

themselves about the political process and to articulate their views.

• Support the traditionalists against the fundamentalists:

— Publicize traditionalist criticism of fundamentalist violence and extremism;

encourage disagreements between traditionalists and fundamentalists.

— Discourage alliances between traditionalists and fundamentalists.

— Encourage cooperation between modernists and the traditionalists who

are closer to the modernist end of the spectrum.

— Where appropriate, educate the traditionalists to equip them better for

debates against fundamentalists. Fundamentalists are often rhetorically

superior, while traditionalists practice a politically inarticulate folk

Islam. In such places as Central Asia, they may need to be educated

and trained in orthodox Islam to be able to stand their ground.

— Increase the presence and profile of modernists in traditionalist institutions.

xii Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies

— Discriminate between different sectors of traditionalism. Encourage

those with a greater affinity to modernism, such as the Hanafi law

school, versus others. Encourage them to issue religious opinions and

popularize these to weaken the authority of backward Wahhabiinspired

religious rulings. This relates to funding: Wahhabi money goes

to the support of the conservative Hanbali school. It also relates to

knowledge: More-backward parts of the Muslim world are not aware of

advances in the application and interpretation of Islamic law.

— Encourage the popularity and acceptance of Sufism.

• Confront and oppose the fundamentalists:

— Challenge their interpretation of Islam and expose inaccuracies.

— Reveal their linkages to illegal groups and activities.

— Publicize the consequences of their violent acts.

— Demonstrate their inability to rule, to achieve positive development of

their countries and communities.

— Address these messages especially to young people, to pious traditionalist

populations, to Muslim minorities in the West, and to women.

— Avoid showing respect or admiration for the violent feats of fundamentalist

extremists and terrorists. Cast them as disturbed and cowardly,

not as evil heroes.

— Encourage journalists to investigate issues of corruption, hypocrisy, and

immorality in fundamentalist and terrorist circles.

— Encourage divisions among fundamentalists.

• Selectively support secularists:

— Encourage recognition of fundamentalism as a shared enemy, discourage

secularist alliance with anti-U.S. forces on such grounds as

nationalism and leftist ideology.

— Support the idea that religion and the state can be separate in Islam too

and that this does not endanger the faith but, in fact, may strengthen it.

Whichever approach or mix of approaches is chosen, we recommend that it be

done with careful deliberation, in knowledge of the symbolic weight of certain

issues; the meaning likely to be assigned to the alignment of U.S. policymakers

with particular positions on these issues; the consequences of these alignments

for other Islamic actors, including the risk of endangering or discrediting the

very groups and people we are seeking to help; and the opportunity costs and

possible unintended consequences of affiliations and postures that may seem

appropriate in the short term.

xiii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Zalmay Khalilzad, Jerrold Green, Theodore Karasik, Angel

Rabasa, Phyllis Gilmore, Luetta Pope, Joanna Alberdeston, and Robin Cole for

their comments, suggestions, and assistance with this report.


xv

GLOSSARY

burqa The voluminous, all-covering outer garment worn by Afghan

women

fatwa A formal pronouncement on a doctrinal or legal matter by an

Islamic scholar or scholarly body

hadith A narrated story relating to the actions or sayings of the

prophet Muhammad and his closest followers, presumed to

reflect the correct way of doing things and to supplement

the guidance given in the Quran. An exacting science has

been created around the need to substantiate and verify

hadith, but the very hugeness of the body of hadith makes it

subject to accidental or intentional misuse.

Hanafi One of the schools of Islamic law; more liberal on most matters

Hanbali One of the schools of Islamic law; more conservative on most

matters

hijab Literally, the Islamic dress code for women; the term can

be used to refer to the simple headscarf or to more

elaborate coverings

hudud Specific Islamic criminal punishments

ijma Community consensus as a tool of modifying and interpreting

Islamic law

ijtihad The practice of informed interpretation, another tool for

establishing and modifying correct Islamic practice

Khilafa Another spelling for Caliphate

kufr Non-Islamic disbelief

xvi Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies

madrassa Generic term for an Islamic religious school, whether of the

traditional nonpolitical variety or as a politicized source of

radical fundamentalist indoctrination

mullah An Islamic preacher, regardless of the level of training and

education

Quran The Islamic holy book

sharia Also commonly spelled shariah or shariat; the entire body of

Islamic law and guidance, based on the Quran, hadith, and

scholarly judgments and open to selective use and interpretation

Shia Islam Literally, faction or party; a dissident version of Islam that

began with a dispute over the leadership succession shortly

after the death of Muhammad and then developed further

doctrinal and political differences vis-à-vis orthodox, Sunni

Islam

Sufisim Islamic mysticism, either in its variant as a populist folk religion

or organized in Sufi religious orders

Sunni Islam The orthodox version of Islam adhered to by the overwhelming

majority, although Shia Islam is dominant in some

countries and regions

sunnah The body of tradition complementing the Quran

sura A section or verse of the Quran and the organizing principle

structuring the revelations

Ulama Body of scholars, scholarly community

ummah The community of believers

Wahhabi An extremist, puritanical, and aggressive form of Islamic fundamentalism

founded in the 18th century and adopted by

the house of Saud; disrespecting other versions of Islam,

including Sufi Islam, Shia Islam, and moderate Islam in

general as incorrect aberrations of the true religion. Its

expansionist ambitions are heavily funded by the Saudi

government.

*******************************8

1

Chapter One

MAPPING THE ISSUES: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE

RANGE OF THOUGHT IN CONTEMPORARY ISLAM

The notion that the outside world should try to encourage a moderate, democratic

interpretation and presentation of Islam has been in circulation for some

decades but gained great urgency after September 11, 2001.

There is broad agreement that this is a constructive approach. Islam is an

important religion with enormous political and societal influence; it inspires a

variety of ideologies and political actions, some of which are dangerous to

global stability; and it therefore seems sensible to foster the strains within it that

call for a more moderate, democratic, peaceful, and tolerant social order. The

question is how best to do this. This report identifies a direction.

We begin by setting the scene for the main ideological fissures in the discussion

over Islam and society. The second chapter analyzes the pros and cons of supporting

different elements within Islam. The final chapter proposes a strategy.

Immediately following September 11, 2001, political leaders and policymakers

in the West began to issue statements affirming their conviction that Islam was

not to blame for what had happened, that Islam was a positive force in the

world, a religion of peace and tolerance. They spoke in mosques, held widely

publicized meetings with Muslim clerics, invited mullahs to open public events,

and inserted Quranic suras into their own speeches.

In a typical formulation, for example, President Bush asserted that Islam is a

faith that brings comfort to a billion people around the world and that has

made brothers and sisters of every race. Its a faith based upon love, not hate

(Bush, 2002).

This approach has not been unique to the United States but is also prevalent in

Europe, where it led some commentators to note sarcastically that the political

leadership collectively appears to have acquired an instant postgraduate

degree in Islamic studies, enabling them to lecture the population concerning

the true nature of Islam (Heitmeyer, 2001).

In part, this demonstrative public embracing of Islam by opinion leaders and

politicians had a domestic rationale: Western leaders were attempting to pre2

Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies

vent a backlash that might have inspired acts of violence and hostility aimed at

their respective Muslim minorities. In addition, there were at least two foreign

policy motivations, one short term and the other longer term. In the short run,

the goal was to make it politically possible for Muslim governments to support

the effort against terrorism by detaching the issue of terrorism from the issue of

Islam. In the longer run, the Western leaders were attempting to create an

image, a vision, that would facilitate the better integration of Islamic political

actors and states into the modern international system.

The academic community quickly joined in, trying to make the case that Islam

was at a minimum compatible with, if indeed it did not demand, moderation,

tolerance, diversity, and democracy. In his introduction to Abdulaziz Sachedinas

The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism, Joseph Montville expresses the

purpose of such studies and the motivation of the Center for Strategic and

International Studies in funding this one,

We knew that, like every great world religion, Islam embraced certain universal

human values that could be recognized and accepted as the basis of community

by non-Muslims . . . Prof. Sachedina . . . knew he could highlight those parts of

the Koran . . . that emphasized the dignity of the individual, freedom of conscience,

and Gods love for all creatures, People of the Book and even people

without a book. (Sachedina, 2001, p. 1)

And the author himself explains,

This work undertakes to map some of the most important political concepts in

Islam that advance better human relationships, both within and between

nations. It aims at uncovering normative aspects of Muslim religious formulations

and specifying their application in diverse cultures to suggest their critical

relevance to the pluralistic world order of the 21st century. . . . The goal here is

not to glorify the Muslim past but to remember it, retrace its path, interpret it,

reconstruct it and make it relevant to the present. (Sachedina, 2001, p. 1;

emphasis added)

However, even as one group of authors was seeking to highlight one set of

values to be found in the Quran and tradition, other authors were successfully

finding and energetically publicizing quite another set of values.

Even as liberal scholars within and outside the Muslim world were gathering

intellectual arguments that supported liberal, tolerant Islam, the terrorists were

making equal reference to Islam, asserting that their mission and methods were

mandated directly by their religion. The celebratory tone taken in some Islamic

communities following the attacks soberingly showed that this view was shared

by a certain—and not a small—segment of the Muslim public. Even a year after

the event, radical clerics meeting in London to celebrate the September 11

attacks averred in their press conference that these had been an exercise in

just retribution and thus a proper Islamic act (Bowcott, 2002).

Mapping the Issues 3

Western leaders and supportive governments in the Muslim world have tried

hard to detach the terrorists goals from Islam; the radicals are equally determined

to keep the issues joined.1

For many Western opinion leaders, the goal of opposing terrorists, of preventing

the conflict from turning into a clash of religions, and of discrediting the

radicals interpretation of Islam, made it seem all the more advisable to support

the more benign strains within Islam—but which ones, exactly, and with what

concrete goal in mind? Identifying the elements that should be supported,

choosing appropriate methods, and defining the goals of such support is difficult.

It is no easy matter to transform a major world religion. If nation-building is a

daunting task, religion-building is immeasurably more perilous and complex.

Islam is neither a homogeneous entity nor a simple system. Many extraneous

issues and problems have become entangled with religion, and many of the

political actors in the region deliberately seek to Islamize the debate in a way

that they think will further their goals.

THE SETTING: SHARED PROBLEMS, DIFFERENT ANSWERS

Islams current crisis has two main components: The Islamic world has been

marked by a long period of backwardness and comparative powerlessness;

many different solutions, such as nationalism, pan-Arabism, Arab socialism,

and Islamic revolution, have been attempted without success;2 and this has led

to frustration and anger. At the same time, the Islamic world has fallen out of

step with contemporary global culture, as well as moving increasingly to the

margins of the global economy.

Muslims disagree on what to do about this, on what has caused it, and on what

their societies ultimately should look like. We can distinguish four essential

positions, as the following paragraphs describe.

The fundamentalists3 put forth an aggressive, expansionist version of Islam

that does not shy away from violence. They want to gain political power and

then to impose strict public observance of Islam, as they themselves define it,

forcibly on as broad a population worldwide as possible. Their unit of reference

______________

1For example, in a speech on September 21, 2002, the head of Pakistans fundamentalist Jamaat-e-

Islami party, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, reiterated that the United States was the worst enemy of Islam

and considered Islam as the main hurdle in the way of achieving its ulterior motives in the world.

The so-called alliance against terrorism was in reality an anti-Islamic struggle aimed at eliminating

Muslim countries from the globe.

2See, especially, Roy (1994); Tibi (1988); Ajami (1981); and Rejwan (1998).

3The term Islamist is being variously used by different authors to describe either the fundamentalists

or the traditionalists. To avoid confusion, it will not be used in this report .

4 Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies

is not the nation-state or the ethnic group, but the Muslim community, the

ummah; gaining control of particular Islamic countries can be a step on this

path but is not the main goal.

We can distinguish two strands within fundamentalism. One, which is

grounded in theology and tends to have some roots in one or another kind of

religious establishment, we will refer to as the scriptural fundamentalists. On

the Shia side, this group includes most of the Iranian revolutionaries and, as

one Sunni manifestation, the Saudi-based Wahhabis. The Kaplan congregation,

active among Western diaspora Turks and in Turkey, is another example.

The radical fundamentalists, the second strand, are much less concerned with

the literal substance of Islam, with which they take considerable liberties either

deliberately or because of ignorance of orthodox Islamic doctrine. They usually

do not have any institutional religious affiliations but tend to be eclectic and

autodidactic in their knowledge of Islam. Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, Hizbut-

Tahrir, and a large number of other Islamic radical movements and diffuse

groups worldwide belong to this category.

The fundamentalists do not merely approve of the Islamic practices of the past.

More significantly, they expand on them, applying some of the more stringent

rules more rigorously than the original Islamic community ever did, exercising

an arbitrary selectivity that allows them to ignore or drop more egalitarian, progressive,

tolerant aspects of the Quran and the sunnah, and inventing some

new rules of their own. This is particularly true of the radical fundamentalists.

Not all fundamentalists embrace or even endorse terrorism, at least not the

indiscriminate type of terrorism that targets civilians and often kills Muslims

along with the enemy, but fundamentalism as a whole is incompatible with

the values of civil society and the Western vision of civilization, political order,

and society.

The traditionalists are also divided into two distinct groups: conservative traditionalists

and reformist traditionalists. The distinction is significant.

Conservative traditionalists believe that Islamic law and tradition ought to be

rigorously and literally followed, and they see a role for the state and for the

political authorities in encouraging or at least facilitating this. However, they do

not generally favor violence and terrorism.

Historically, they have grown accustomed to operating under changing political

circumstances, and this has led them to concentrate their efforts on the daily

life of the society, where they try to have as much influence and control as they

can, even when the government is not Islamic. In the social realm, their goal is

to preserve orthodox norms and values and conservative behavior to the fullest

extent possible. The temptations and the pace of modern life are seen as posing

a major threat to this. Their posture is one of resistance to change.

Mapping the Issues 5

Additionally, there are often important differences between conservative traditionalists

who live in the Islamic world or in the Third World generally and

those who live in the West. Being an essentially moderate position, traditionalism

tends to be adaptive to its environment. Thus, conservative traditionalists

who live in traditional societies are likely to accept practices that are prevalent

in such societies, such as child marriage, and to be less educated and less able

to distinguish local traditions and customs from actual Islamic doctrine. Those

who live in the West have absorbed more-modern views on these issues and

tend to be better educated and more linked to the transnational discourse on

issues of orthodoxy.

Reformist traditionalists think that, to remain viable and attractive throughout

the ages, Islam has to be prepared to make some concessions in the literal

application of orthodoxy. They are prepared to discuss reforms and reinterpretations.

Their posture is one of cautious adaptation to change, being flexible on

the letter of the law to conserve the spirit of the law.

The modernists actively seek far-reaching changes to the current orthodox

understanding and practice of Islam. They want to eliminate the harmful ballast

of local and regional tradition that has, over the centuries, intertwined itself

with Islam. They further believe in the historicity of Islam, i.e., that Islam as it

was practiced in the days of the Prophet reflected eternal truths as well as historical

circumstances that were appropriate to that time but are no longer valid.

They think it is possible to identify an essential core of Islamic belief; further,

they believe that this core will not only remain undamaged but in fact will be

strengthened by changes, even very substantial changes, that reflect changing

times, social conditions, and historical circumstances.

The things that modernists value and admire most about Islam tend to be quite

different and more abstract than the things the fundamentalists and the traditionalists

value. Their core values—the primacy of the individual conscience

and a community based on social responsibility, equality, and freedom—are

easily compatible with modern democratic norms.

The secularists believe that religion should be a private matter separate from

politics and the state and that the main challenge lies in preventing transgressions

in either direction. The state should not interfere in the individual exercise

of religion, but equally, religious customs must be in conformity with the

law of the land and with human rights. The Turkish Kemalists, who placed religion

under the firm control of the state, represent the laicist model in Islam.

These positions should be thought of as representing segments on a continuum,

rather than distinct categories. There are no clear boundaries between

them, so that some traditionalists overlap with the fundamentalists; the most

modernist of the traditionalists are almost modernists; and the most extreme

modernists are similar to secularists.

6 Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies

Each of these outlined positions takes a characteristic stance on key issues of

controversy in the contemporary Islamic debate. And their rules of evidence

for defending these positions are also distinct, as sketched in Table 1 (starting

on page 8).

In the contemporary Islamic struggle, lifestyle issues are the field on which

the contending positions try to stake their claims and that they use to signal

their control. Doctrine is territory and is being fought over. This explains the

prominence of such issues in an ideological and political contest.

The utility of mapping the views of the various Islamic positions is that, on

issues of doctrine and lifestyle, they adhere to fairly distinct and reliable platforms,

which define their identity and serve as identifiers toward like-minded

others—a kind of passport.

Thus, while it is possible for groups to dissimulate concerning their attitude to

violence, to avoid prosecution and sanctions, it is not really possible for them to

distort or deny their views on key value and lifestyle issues. These are what

define them and attract new members.

Conservative traditionalists accept the correctness of past practices, even when

they conflict with todays norms and values, on the principle that the original

Islamic community represents the absolute and eternal ideal, but they no

longer necessarily attempt to reinstate all of the practices. Often, however, their

reason for this is not that they would not like to do it, but that they assess it to

be temporarily or permanently unrealistic to do so. Reformist traditionalists

reinterpret, rebut, or evade practices that seem problematic in todays world.

Modernists see the same practices as part of a changing and changeable historical

context; they do not regard the original Islamic community or the early

years of Islam as something that one would necessarily wish to reproduce

today. Secularists prohibit the practices that conflict with modern norms and

laws and ignore the others as belonging to the private sphere of individuals.

Secularists do not concern themselves with what Islam might or might not

require. Moderate secularists want the state to guarantee peoples right to

practice their faith, while ensuring that religion remains a private matter and

does not violate any standards of human rights or civil law. Radical secularists,

including communists and laicists, oppose religion altogether.

Conservative traditionalists seek guidance from conventional Islamic sources:

the Quran, the sunnah, Islamic law, fatwas, and the religious opinions of

respected scholars. Reformist traditionalists use the same sources but tend to

be more inventive and more aggressive in exploring alternative interpretations.

They are aware of the conflicts between modernity and Islam and want to

reduce them to keep Islam viable into the future. They seek to reinterpret tradiMapping

the Issues 7

tional content, to find ways around the restrictions or rulings that trouble them

or stand in the way of desired changes or that harm the image of Islam in the

eyes of the rest of the world.

There are ironic similarities in the way radical fundamentalists and modernists

approach the issue of change. In keeping with convention, they both refer to the

Quran, sunnah, law, fatwas, and authorities (of course, choosing different selections

from each). But ultimately, both positions are guided by their respective

visions of the ideal Islamic society. Each feels authorized to define and interpret

the individual rules and laws in keeping with that vision. Obviously, this gives

them a lot more freedom to maneuver than the traditionalists have.

Fundamentalists have as their goal an ascetic, highly regimented, hierarchical

society in which all members follow the requirements of Islamic ritual strictly,

in which immorality is prevented by separating the sexes, which in turn is

achieved by banishing women from the public domain, and in which life is visibly

and constantly infused by religion. It is totalitarian in its negation of a private

sphere, instead believing that it is the task of state authorities to compel the

individual to adhere to proper Islamic behavior anywhere and everywhere. And

ideally, it wants this system—which it believes to be the only rightful one—to

expand until it controls the entire world and everyone is a Muslim.

Modernists envision a society in which individuals express their piety in a way

each finds personally meaningful, decide most moral matters and lifestyle

issues on the basis of their own consciences, seek to lead ethical lives out of

inner conviction rather than external compulsion, and base their political system

on principles of justice and equality. This system should coexist peacefully

with other orders and religions. The modernists find concepts within Islamic

orthodoxy that support the right of Muslims, as individuals and as communities,

to make changes and revisions even to basic laws and texts.

When a question arises that is not covered in Islamic orthodox texts, or when it

is but they do not like the answer, fundamentalists and modernists both refer

instead to their ideal vision and then innovate a solution. Since innovation is

not generally accepted in Islam, they both define it as something else.

Modernists speak of faith-based objections to specific aspects of Islam, of the

good of the community as a value that overrides even the Quran, of community

consensus (ijma) that legitimizes even radical change.4

Radical fundamentalists reclaim ijtihad, the controversial practice of interpretation,

or refer mysteriously to higher criteria. No traditionalist would ever

argue that orthodox content of the Quran or the hadith can be technically

______________

4See, for example, El Fadl (2001).

8 Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies

Table 1

Marker Issues and the Major Ideological Positions in Islam

Radical

Fundamentalists

Scriptural

Fundamentalists

Conservative

Traditionalists

Democracy A wrongful creed.

Sovereignty and the

right to legislate belong

to God alone.

Islam is a form of

democracy. The West

has no right to define

what democracy

should look like, and

the Islamic form is superior

because it rests

on the only correct and

perfect religion.

There is some room for

democratic instruments

in the interpretation

of Islamic practice,

in community life

and in certain sectors

of public life.

Human rights,

individual liberties

Erroneous decadent

concepts that lead to

corruption. The full

imposition of sharia

creates a good and just

society.

Humans need guidance

and control, but these

must be reasonable

and fair, as set down in

sunnah and the Quran.

Islam, properly lived,

provides the optimum

setting for humans.

Equality and freedom

are wrong concepts;

Islam instead gives everyone

their due in accord

with their station

and nature.

Polygamy Is permitted and there

is nothing wrong with

it. Superior to Western

immorality and serial

divorce.

Permitted as a way to

enhance public and

individual morality,

but not for selfindulgence.

Permitted under certain

circumstances, including

when all wives are

treated equally, as the

Quran requires, and

only if local law permits

it. But monogamy

is superior.

Islamic criminal

penalties, including

flogging, amputations,

stoning

for adultery

An excellent way to

provide swift, deterrent

justice.

Just and correct, but

may have to be implemented

with discretion

as it is no longer quite

in line with world public

opinion and can

thus be detrimental to

the image of Islamic

states.

Should be used if the

country follows sharia

law, which Muslim

countries ought to do.

Severe sharia punishment

has good deterrent

effect but was intended

to be mitigated

by mercy, forgiveness,

rehabilitation efforts,

and strict rules of evidence.

Mapping the Issues 9

Table 1—Continued

Reformist

Traditionalists Modernists

Mainstream

Secularists

Radical

Secularists

Islam has at heart been

democratic from its inception;

the community

of believers is

sovereign, and even the

earliest leaders were

chosen by democratic

means.

Islam contains democratic

concepts that

need to be brought to

the forefront.

Democracy is primary;

Islam must (and can)

bring itself into line

with it and with the

separation of church

and state.

Social justice is

more important

than democracy.

Properly interpreted

and applied, Islam

guarantees human

rights and such liberties

as are actually

good for a person, not

false ones that lead the

person on a wrongful

path.

Islam contains the basic

concepts of human

rights and individual

freedom, including the

freedom to do wrong.

Islam can attempt to

guide the behavior of

those who adhere to it,

in their private lives,

where they can give up

some of their freedoms

if they choose. However,

in overall social

and political life, human

rights are paramount

and universal.

Equality and justice

are more important

than individual

liberties.

Permitted in societies

that legally allow it, but

it should be the exception,

and the agreement

of the first wife

should be obtained. In

general, monogamy is

thought better, but a

defensive traditionalist

position shares the

fundamentalist argument

that polygamy is

better than Western

sexual anarchy.

Not permitted. An archaic

practice, such as

those found in other

religions, that was considered

less than ideal

even at the time, and

there is evidence that

Muhammad was trying

to abolish it.

Against modern laws

and accepted practice;

therefore ,not permitted.

Not permitted, although

some

would also consider

monogamy

to be a hypocritical

bourgeois concept.

Should not be used. The

most severe punishments

were never intended

to be implemented

except in very

rare cases; they have

been misapplied and

misunderstood and often

have no real

Quranic basis.

Should not be used.

These punishments are

either archaic, in line

with the common practice

of their era but no

longer appropriate, or

they were wrongfully

interpreted in the first

place.

Not legal in most

countries and not in

keeping with international

human rights or

contemporary norms;

therefore ,cannot be

applied.

Religion is a fallacy;

therefore, religious

laws can

never be legitimate.

10 Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies

Table 1—Continued

Radical

Fundamentalists

Scriptural

Fundamentalists

Conservative

Traditionalists

Hijab Women must wear

Islamic garments, usually

to cover all but the

face and hands but, in

some places, also to

conceal the face and

hands. In the diaspora,

a headscarf is the acceptable

minimum. It

is societys job to make

sure women adhere to

this rule through persuasion,

pressure, education,

and coercion.

Men must also conform

visually, usually

by wearing a beard and

short hair.

Islamic covering is required

for women and

should be coercively

enforced.

Hijab is preferable. It

can be enforced by

family, peer, and community

pressure. Not

all traditionalists agree

that real coercion is

also acceptable. Both

genders should dress

modestly. Traditionalists

in conservative societies:

Women should

cover everything but

the hands and face.

Traditionalists in the

West and in modern

societies: The scarf and

long clothing is

enough.

Beating of wives Allowed and useful to

control behavior of

women and to maintain

hierarchy in the

family.

The Quran allows it, but

it is permissible only as

a well-intentioned

pedagogical intervention

to correct the behavior

of an errant wife

for her own good and

that of the family and

society.

Same as scriptural fundamentalists.

Status of minorities

Tolerated, but they

cannot practice their

own religion or culture

in any visible way. They

are inferior, and thus it

is acceptable to discriminate

against

them. It is best if they

convert.

Tolerated, as long as

they do not engage in

missionary activities.

Tolerated and should

be treated decently and

allowed to practice

their religions and

cultures, unless they

are contrary to Islamic

morality and law.

Islamic state An Islamic state should

be global and supranational.

It should guide

all conduct, policing

such things as prayer

attendance, beard

length, clothing. Any

matter not explicitly

covered by a rule requires

the advice of a

religious authority.

Islam is possible on the

basis of individual

states, although a

supranational ummah

remains the ideal.

An Islamic state is best,

because people can

then most fully exercise

their religion. Next best

is to live immersed in

an Islamic community,

doing as told by your

elders, family, and the

communitys religious

leaders.

Mapping the Issues 11

Table 1—Continued

Reformist

Traditionalists Modernists

Mainstream

Secularists

Radical

Secularists

Women should dress

modestly; the definition

of that depends on

where the traditionalist

lives and ranges from

all-but-face-and-hands

to the scarf to no scarf,

as long as the body is

not provocatively displayed.

Islam does not require

women to wear any

sort of veil or head covering.

There is no textual

substantiation for

such rules. It is up to

the individual to decide

what to wear. Women

should not be held responsible

for mens

possible licentious

thoughts, since the

Quran clearly instructs

men to lower their

gaze, i.e., not to stare

salaciously at women,

and vice versa.

Muslims can wear

whatever they want,

but public schools and

professions where it

would impinge on performance

or the rights

of others can, if they

see fit, prohibit the

wearing of hijab,

scarves, etc.

Hijab is a symbol

of backwardness,

and women

should not want to

wear it, let alone

be pressured or

forced into doing

so.

No longer allowed, and

the religious basis for it

is questionable anyway.

The Quranic passage

permitting it has

been challenged, and

many hadiths reflect

Muhammads disapproval

of it.

Not allowed, based on

incorrect religious interpretation,

and

clearly against the

spirit of Islamic

concept of marriage

and gender relations.

Not allowed, because it

is illegal, and against

contemporary norms

and human rights.

Reflects archaic

notion of wives as

property, and so is

not allowed.

Tolerated, and they

should be well treated,

encouraged to practice

their religions and

cultures if possible,

and should be engaged

in dialogue.

Should be treated on

equal footing.

Assimilation into secular

society is best.

Most of these affiliations

represent

false consciousness.

An Islamic state is best.

Barring that, individual

religious studies are

important, backed by

support of a likeminded

community

and religious experts to

give guidance.

Islam was not meant to

be a state but a code

and guiding philosophy

for life. The individual

holds ultimate

responsibility for his or

her behavior and decisions,

in the context of

an ever-changing, vibrant

community of

thinking and questioning

rational individuals.

Islam is a religion and

thus a private matter;

the state has the obligation

to allow it, but

Muslims have the obligation

to obey civil law

and local custom and

to adapt to the age in

which they live.

Religion is a retrograde

force in society

and should

be abolished.

12 Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies

Table 1—Continued

Radical

Fundamentalists

Scriptural

Fundamentalists

Conservative

Traditionalists

Public participation

of women

There must be maximum

separation of

women from men.

Women should be excluded

from the public

domain to the fullest

extent possible.

Iranian style Shia fundamentalism:

Women

should play an active

role in society and political

life, but there

must be strict segregation,

and the highest

offices in justice and

government are reserved

for men. Sunni:

Governance is the domain

of men. Women

can be active in fields

related to children and

social matters.

Women are responsible

for the family; if that is

completely taken care

of, they can be active in

certain professions and

in community and

public life but in a

subsidiary function.

Jihad There are different levels

of jihad, but armed

struggle for the establishment

of a universal

and worldwide Islamic

order is incumbent

upon anyone physically

capable of participating.

This can take

the form of classical

warfare or of terrorism

and insurgency.

The definition of jihad

varies from person to

person. For women,

childbirth is a form of

jihad. Jihad includes

the struggle for personal

spiritual betterment.

For some groups

under some circumstances,

it includes

armed struggle, including

terrorism.

Jihad is primarily the

struggle for personal

moral betterment, but

it encompasses war on

behalf of Islam when

necessary and appropriate.

Sources The Quran, sunnah,

charismatic leaders,

radical authors, with all

details subordinated to

the broad vision of a

rigorously pious,

Islamic society.

The Quran, sunnah,

Islamic philosophy,

science, scholarly

interpretation, and

charismatic leaders.

The Quran, sunnah, local

custom and tradition,

and the opinions

of local mullahs

Mapping the Issues 13

Table 1—Continued

Reformist

Traditionalists Modernists

Mainstream

Secularists

Radical

Secularists

Women are responsible

first for the family,

which is a very important

role, but they can